sehepunkte 26 (2026), Nr. 2

Edward M. Anson (ed.): Brill's Companion to the Campaigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great

As is inevitable with a multi-authored volume, I will deal with the individual contributions as they appear in the volume, giving only summary accounts, pausing only at those which have caught my especial attention.

Frances Pownall gives an account of 'Philip's Grand Strategy'.(chap. I, 17-34) She notes how remarkably uninformative the sources are of Philip's victory at Chaeronea, and his deliberate choice of Corinth to form the alliance for his anti-Persian crusade. Matthew A. Sears give an account of 'Alexander's Battles.(chap. 2, 35-60) In 'Modern Military Terminology and Ancient Practices' (chap. 3, 61-87) Edward M. Anson parallels Macedonian with modern military practice (and terminology). The term 'shock and awe' in this and other contributions, I suggest, means nothing more than the traditional term coup de main.

In chapter 4 Joseph Roisman gives a valuable account of 'Philip and Alexander's Naval Warfare'.(88-112) The nature of the evidence makes it an episodic account, for the reigns of Philip and Alexander alike. Philip rarely commanded his fleet in person, because he was a leader of land forces 'by skill and preference'. His choice of admirals was constrained, and, for example, Demetrius is also attested as a land commander.(95) Although the sources concentrate on Alexander's land campaigns, Roisman gives a coherent and connected narrative of naval operations down to the siege of Tyre.

Elizabeth Baynham studies 'The Sieges of Philip and Alexander'.(chap. 5, 113-132) Her account starts with a discussion of the historicity of the account of the treatment of the corpse of Batis. She is particularly strong on the sieges of Philip and traces the parallel development in artillery capability.

Graham C.L. Wrightson deals with 'The Macedonian Heavy Infantry of Philip II and Alexander the Great' (chap. 6, 135-163). While it is impossible to know when the Macedonian phalanx began to use the sarisa (140) Wrightson goes through modern opinions bearing on this subject. He repeats the speculation that phalangites 'armed with sarissas could not hold shields as well and thus their shields hung from their shoulders and attached at the forearm as protection' (139) in defiance of the representational evidence.

In 'Macedonian and Thessalian Cavalry' (chap. 7, 164-186) Carolyn Willekes gives an account in which the emphasis is very much on the horse. She deals with questions such as whether there were established sustainable breeding programmes in Macedonia prior to Philip (166), branding found on Macedonian horses, and equine images on Macedonian coins. Her treatment of the evidence dealing with Thessaly is no less interesting and informative. Franca Landucci examines 'The Role of Mercenaries'.(chap. 8, 187-201) Starting with Philip's mercenaries, then Alexander's, she finally looks at the Greek mercenaries fighting for Persia after entering Alexander's service. In Chapter 9 Sudochana R. Asirvatham deals with 'Infantry Allies and Subjects'.(202-219) We have next to no information on Balkan allies in the army of Philip, but she speculates that they were present. She attempts to distinguish between the Odryssian, Triballian and Illyrian allied contingents accompanying Alexander.

Waldemar Heckel supplies 'Commanders and Command Structure in Alexander's Army' .(chap. 10, 223-245) His account, despite its copious merits, is not free from error. The strength of both the Companion and Thessalian Cavalry was 1,800 divided into 8 squadrons. Heckel accordingly calculates the strength of each squadron to be 225, but Arrian mentions units of 200 Companions (1.18.1) and Thessalians (1.29.4) so one concludes that the squadron numbered 200. The Royal and the Pharsalian squadrons (Arr. 3.11.10) were both double-strength. In 331 each squadron was divided into two lochoi, later to be renamed ἑκατοστύας, 'a hundred', confirming that the strength of the squadron must have been 200. The reference in Arrian 1.24.3 to a hipparchia of Companions is not necessarily an 'anachronism'.(225) Prior to the formal reorganization of the Companions into hipparchiai, the same term is used of a formation comprising a number of squadrons. Heckel is clearly confused by references to hypaspistai basilikoi.(239) I have suggested that this term is given to the agēma, or 'vanguard' lochos of the hypaspists. I address all these problems in my 1984 book The Army of Alexander the Great. It is strange indeed that my book, the first one ever to be written on Alexander's army, is nowhere referred to in the book under review - perhaps it was too richly illustrated for the austere taste of the ancient historian.

'Money and Honor: Military Compensation in The Armies of Philip and Alexander' are examined by Alexander Meeus.(chap. 11, 246-263) He concludes that Philip II probably paid a ration allowance (siteresion) and a further payment (misthos) to mercenaries.(250) The mention of a man on double pay in 326/5 (Arr. Anab. 6.9.3) seems to provide a terminus ante quem for at least part of the payment system outlined in Arrian Anab. 7.2.3. Other forms of awards, such as land-grants or golden crowns, are also dealt with. Jacek Rzepka deals with 'Recruitment and Training'.(chap. 12, 264-277) He correctly stresses the dangers of extrapolating what we know from the sources dealing with Alexander into previous periods. He maintains that Philip divided the country into recruitment districts, and further that each squadron of Companion Cavalry and each regiment of Companion Infantry in Alexander's Expeditionary force 'was originally enrolled in one district' (267), which is difficult to argue from the available evidence.

'Food and Conquest: Getting Beyond Engels' (chap. 13, 281-297) by James Lacey is a critique of David Engels' Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (1970). 'Engels presents a long series of logistical problems without making it clear how they could possibly be overcome'.(292) This is due to a series of false assumptions. The first is that the army did not use wagons, which results in an absurdity, 'that the army could only march for four days before the pack-animals would have eaten everything they could carry'.(288) We have plenty of evidence that waggons were in regular use in Alexander's army. 'It is possible that many of these wagons were owned and managed by private contractors (sutlers) who would charge the soldiers for much of their foodstuffs', and Lacey adds (288 n. 16) 'This would explain how the soldiers accumulated a huge debt- between 10,000 and 20,000 talents - that Alexander had to pay off for them'.

In 'The Medical Corps in the Army of Alexander the Great' (chap. 14, 298-342) David Karunanithy attempts to reconstitute the medical service available to the army. Although accompanied by no more than ten doctors, the army was also attended by around fifty or more individuals with medical skills. Wounded soldiers were attached to the baggage train, situated near the camp centre before the royal tent.(324-5) To the best of my knowledge this is the first time that any attempt has been made to reconstruct the medical services of any Greek army and deserves the appropriate praise.

'Conditions of Service and Indiscipline in Macedonian Armies, 359-323 BCE' (chap. 15, 345-391) by Lee L. Brice tries to define the terms of service, and under what conditions they broke down, resulting in insubordination and mutiny. The infrequency of such incidents is a testimony to the leadership exercised by Philip and Alexander. In 'Military Propaganda in the Campaigns of Alexander the Great' (chap. 16, 392-428) Jenn Finn makes an exhaustive study of the subject. The bibliography takes up nine pages. In 'Philip's and Alexander's Use of Religious Cult in Our Extant Sources' (chap. 17, 429-476) Jeanne Reames gathers the evidence for Philip's and Alexander's use of religious cult, which principally concerns Alexander.

In chapter 18 Carol J. King investigates the 'Relationship of King and Army'. (479-500) Macedonia has army assemblies in which individuals speak freely, but the assembly is not constitutional.(480) Chapter 19 'The Affective Nature of Command' (501-526) by Monica D'Agostini examines the role that personal affection played in the appointment to positions of command. Individuals studied are, for the reign of Philip, Alexander himself and Cynanne, and for the reign of Alexander Cleitus, Hephaistion and Peucestas.

The last three contributions by Elizabeth Carney, 'Women in War' (chap. 20, 529-550), Sabine Müller, 'War Crimes?' (chap. 21, 551-575), and Edward M. Anson, 'Conclusion: "We Are the Champions": The Underlying Reality of Ancient War' (chap. 22, 579-603), intersect in many places. Barsine, who fell into Macedonian hands after Issus, became 'a rape victim'. Carney (545) and Müller (564-5) both contrast her treatment to the female members of the Persian royal family. Principally Carney's contribution deals with the female victims of Macedonian military imperialism on the enemy side, but the consequences for women left behind in Macedonia are also dealt with. Carney (540) speculates that war captives were put to work on family farms, replacing absent Macedonian spouses, and therefore releasing them for ever longer periods of mobilization. Müller and Anson both conclude that, although Alexander and Philip were both guilty of war crimes according to modern definitions, both, in general, adhered to the conventions of the period.

I found it irritating that, throughout the volume the name of the Macedonian infantry pike has been spelt incorrectly with a double letter -s-. The Greek-English Lexicon of Liddell & Scott states that although the word sarisa was commonly written by the ancient Greeks themselves with two sigmas in the middle 'from ignorance that the i was by nature long'. The word is spelt correctly as sarisa.